A Wise Step?

Discussion in 'Links' started by Wadood, Nov 8, 2006.

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Should Deobandīs and Baraylawīs Unite?

  1. Yes!

    20.0%
  2. No!

    80.0%
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  1. Wadood

    Wadood Veteran

    to tell you the truth, as I have seen with my eyes, the deobandis in the Indian SubContinent are almost like wahabis except much of the pathan deobandis who are very moderate

    so the question becomes essentially, should we unite with these type of wahabis?
     
  2. Seeker_51

    Seeker_51 New Member

    It would be great but not going to happen.. too many stubborn elements on each side
     
  3. I didn't read the article in detail but from what I've read it seems okay. The problem, brother, is that the Deobandis are unwilling to give up slandering those beliefs of ours which, as you noted, do NOT go against Sunni mainstream [aka Barelvi]. More problematic is their insistance in defending the indefensible blasphemies uttered by a number of their top scholars about Allah and His Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم --rather, to this day, they insist on finding 1001 excuses for them.

    If they can distance themselves from those blasphemies I don't see why we cannot work together. As for Sunni ulama, they do rail against the lax practises which occur amongst many Sunnis.
     
  4. Muhammadi

    Muhammadi Well-Known Member

    THE Conflict

    An Objective Attempt.

    The Deobandī (also known as Wahhābī) / Baraylawī inferno has been blazing for over a century. These two sons of the same father are bitter enemies of each other and staunch followers of their spiritual, religious and political leaders. Both sides contain many renowned academics, scholars, intellects, teachers, learned men and women, mystics, professionals in all fields and of course, both are adorned with the esteemed “elite” or “top brass” who tend to occupy the spiritual and religious leadership of these groups.

    Both groups are very powerful to the extent that they hold prominent positions in both Indian and Pakistani societies. Interestingly, though not surprising (because of their strong devotion and extreme passion towards what they believe and opine), both groups have presented significant and outstanding contributions (both negative and positive) to the political scenes before the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and have not just continued but increased after the creation of Pakistan.

    The two groups have their own hardliner-styled loyalists located all over the world who are prepared to shed their blood in the name of Islām although – some may argue – most of that blood usually serves Deobandī and Baraylawī interests.

    However, for the Baraylawīs, this may not always be considered objectionable because Baraylawīs rarely use violence (in terms of taking up arms) and when they do resort to violence then it is usually pertaining to regaining control of ex-Baraylawī mosques, shrines, and/or schools, etc. when diplomatic routes fail.

    The Deobandīs contain numerous organisations within themselves who are strictly organised into unswerving, strong and powerful military-styled religious fanatics – nearly all of whom are banned in many countries for acts of gross terrorism.

    The Deobandīs contain numerous organisations who are armed and do frequently use violence to further their interests. The Tālibān are mainly Deobandī in creed and nearly all Islamic schools in Pakistan and surrounding areas (like India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan) against which the Governments of the world object are Deobandī controlled.

    These Deobandī controlled groups or “mobs” tend to assassinate prominent Shī’ah figures and exterminate anything or anyone endangering them. Therefore, this shows that these offshoots in Deobandī-ism are the cause of Deobandī-ism’s occupation of Jihād leadership across the globe.

    The Deobandīs have a lot of innocent blood attributed to them but the Deobandīs claim that all violence from them is nothing but self-defence, defending Muslim brothers and sisters and retaliation for previous grievances such as the murder of prominent Deobandī figures.

    They also train and recruit people for Jihād in Kashmir and other places through which they justify their necessity of being armed with weapons.

    The Baraylawīs – on the other hand – do not have a single organised military-styled organisation. The only Baraylawī group known for some violence is “Sunnī Tahrīq” whose leaders were blown to death in April 2006 during a gathering of Milād an-Nabī (‘alayhis salātu was-salām). This mass-assassination of Sunnī Tahrīq leaders was also planned and executed by Deobandī extremists according to some Baraylawī hardliners but no evidence of this has been produced so far.

    Two prominent causes fuel the disorganisation of Baraylawīs that explain why they cannot really organise themselves. This disorganisation is not just located in Pakistan, but all over the world. Reasons being:

    (1) They have a large number of internal differences that have led to the split of this group into many factions. This cause plagues both the scholars and the general Baraylawī public. This cause equally plagues the Deobandīs but they tend to brush such internal differences under the carpet.
    (2) According to many reports, the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the world subscribe themselves to the Baraylawī school of thought. The irony is, although the majority calls itself “Baraylawī”, most of them do not have the slightest clue about the label they carry yet they still oppose anything that is non-Baraylawī. This is because Baraylawī beliefs have been passed down from generation to generation in different names (for example, Sunnī, Sūfī, as-Sawād al-A’zam, etc.) thereby securing a vehement opposition to all beliefs, notions, ideas, opinions, etc. which don’t conform to the Baraylawī school of thought which claims to be based upon the Qurān and Sunnah.

    These very same Baraylawīs are known to many in the UK as Sūfīs or “the silent majority”.

    Whatever the case may be, the Deobandīs are certainly an armed group in Pakistan and surrounding areas in contrast to the Baraylawīs who are unarmed and for the most part, disorganised in nearly all levels.

    The Baraylawīs are apparently armed with the Love of the Prophet Muhammad (‘alayhis salātu was-salām) which could explain:

    (1) Why – despite the come-and-go of a full century – they haven’t really bothered to arm themselves with weapons or create a military-styled wing which would presumable defend their interests if all hell broke loose (that is, when diplomacy fails);
    (2) The grand gatherings Baraylawīs organise to glorify the Prophet Muhammad (‘alayhis salātu was-salām) to which thousands and some times millions attend.

    However, the Baraylawīs should present proof of such love by acting upon the Qurān and Sunnah and by raising their voices loud enough against the many innovations and polytheisms that are widespread in Asia.

    The glory does not end here. Both groups have firm roots in classical sub continental politics upon which they exercise a considerable amount of influence.

    This has led volumes to be penned down on the golden history of the sub continental ‘Ulamā and their deep-rooted relations with politics.

    The Baraylawīs dominated the political arena before the creation of Pakistan and continue to take part in present day Pakistani politics. However, in the present arena, they have no political dominance nor do they exhort much influence on their own affairs, never mind the affairs of the opposition. This downfall came about after the death of Mowlānā Nūrānī.

    Mowlānā Shāh Ahmad Nūrānī from the Baraylawī side founded and until his death headed the J. U. P. (Jam’iyyat ‘Ulamā-e-Pākistān or the Assembly of Pākistānī Scholars) that is a political party in Pakistan. The late Mowlānā Nūrānī was also the founder and head of the M. M. A. (Muttahiddah Majlis-e-‘Amal) that is a religious and political alliance between Islamic parties and could be arguably one of the most influential and powerful opposition party in Pakistan. The JUP is also a member of the MMA.

    The MMA party rules the N. W. F. P. (North-West Frontier Province) of Pakistan.

    In addition, he had joined the Pakistan National Alliance in the 1977 elections and introduced the concept of “Tahrīq-e-Nizām-e-Mustafā” (‘alayhis salātu was-salām) which aimed to implement the way of Prophet Muhammad (‘alayhis salātu was-salām) in Pakistan. The slogan “Nizām-e-Mustafā” (‘alayhis salātu was-salām) was later copied and echoed by leaders from both the Baraylawī and Deobandī groups and was made the campaign subject of the Alliance.

    Mowlānā Nūrānī was the main player in declaring Qādiyānīs a non-Muslim minority of Pakistan. This bill was passed in the Pakistani National Assembly on the 30th of June 1974.

    It must be noted that Mowlānā Nūrānī was widely respected and highly revered by both supporters and opponents alike. He was the ambassador of the Baraylawīs in the political arena, which shows the huge influence exerted by Baraylawīs in Pakistani politics.

    The above-mentioned facts are a few examples of Baraylawī politics.

    As far as the Deobandīs are concerned, they have literally dominated the political stage of Pakistani politics after the creation of Pakistan even though they had vigorously opposed its creation in the first place by siding with the Indian National Congress. The Deobandīs had not only opposed the founder of Pakistan on a political level, but also on a religious level by issuing Fatwās against him declaring him an infidel, apostate, enemy of Islām, pig eater, etc. They also ridiculed the name “Pākistān” which they conveniently (for them) changed to “Palīdistān” which instead means “land of the impure”. Nevertheless, they managed to secure political domination (in terms of opposition) once it was created.

    It most be noted that a few prominent Deobandī scholars did support the creation of Pakistan such as Mowlānā Shabīr Ahmad Usmānī (who lead Muhammad ‘Alī Jināh’s funeral prayers) and Muftī Muhammad Shafī’.

    Today amongst prominent Deobandī groups are the J. U. I. (Jam’iyyat ‘Ulamā-e-Islām or the Assembly of Islāmic Scholars) which has actually split into two factions, one headed by Mowlānā Fazl ar-Rahmān (whose father Muftī Mahmūd founded the group) and the other by Mowlānā Sami’ al-Haq. Both factions are now individual organisations operating under the same name and both are members of the MMA.

    Perhaps the most organised and the largest component of the MMA is the famous Jamā’at-e-Islāmī that was founded by Mowlānā Mowdūdī (who was Deobandī in creed though not in thinking) and is now headed by Qāzī Husayn Ahmad, a Deobandī who is also the present leader of the MMA. Jamā’at-e-Islāmī is also a member of the prestigious MMA.

    Finally, we also have the Tanzīm-e-Islāmī which is an offshoot of Jamā’at-e-Islāmī and is headed by Dr. Isrār Ahmad (Deobandī in creed). This group is a political organisation that advocates the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Pakistan. However, this group is not a member of the MMA as it seems to have some internal differences with Jamā’at-e-Islāmī.

    The above-mentioned facts are a few examples of Deobandī politics.

    The reality of the matter is that both groups have counselled a large degree of power and influence on Asian politics and have in many cases made top brass history such as the Deobandīs siding with the (pro-Hindu and largely anti-Muslim) Indian National Congress in opposing the creation of Pakistan and the Baraylawīs who managed to organise themselves on a national level through forming a national Sunnī alliance to support the creation of Pakistan.

    There is another interesting factor relating to the Deobandīs and Baraylawīs. That is, they both have very large and highly funded Islamic missionary and revival organisations which claim to propagate Islām to the world. These groups hail literally millions of people from all around the world from many different and diverse backgrounds.

    The Deobandīs, for example, control the Tablīgī Jamā’at which was founded in 1920 by a senior Deobandī cleric, Mowlānā Ilyās Kānadihlawī. The Tablīgī Jamā’at is a largely non-political (although accused of terrorism) international Islamic propagation movement. It was founded at first to win the hearts and minds of those Hindus who were once Muslims but later the Jamā’at evolved to its present stage.

    The Tablīgī Jamā’at has six aims:

    (1) Conviction of faith - belief in the oneness of Allāh. This is expanded to mean that the creation cannot do anything without the will of Allāh, but Allāh can do everything without the creation. It also has the adjunct of belief that complete success in this world and the hereafter is only achieved in following the way of life shown by Prophet Muhammad (‘alayhis salātu was-salām) and every other way leads to failure in this world and the hereafter.
    (2) Humility & devotion in Salāh - perfection in observance of prayers.
    (3) Acquiring knowledge and remembrance of Allāh.
    (4) Good behaviour towards Muslims, and others. Sacrificing ones own needs in order to fulfil anothers needs. Includes respecting ones elders and showing kindness to somebody younger.
    (5) Purity of intention. Meaning that all good actions should be solely for the pleasure of Allāh and not for fame or materialistic gain.
    (6) Inviting to Allāh - spending ones time and money in the "Path of Allāh" (inviting towards good actions like charity, prayer and calling people towards Allāh).

    It may be useful to note here that many Tablīgī Jamā’at members are illiterate and unleared. They join the Tablīgī Jamā’at without learning the necessities and begin to preach a more puritanical and extremist Islām which one could call a twisted interpertation of Islām. This interpretation requires them to travel “in the way of Allāh” (otherwise known to them as “Gasht”) and leave their families and wealth for long periods of time – sometimes even years! This has caused a backlash in the Tablīgī Jamā’at with many women divorcing their husbands who are away from home for long intervals.

    This group does not have a uniform, e.g. same colour of turbans. However, they are easily recognised when seen in groups of differently dressed Muslims preaching together on the streets with many of them having their pants or pyjamas quite high above their ankles.

    The Tablīgī Jamā’at does not have an official website and is still yet to bless the internet with its presence.

    Although the Tablīgī Jamā’at is a large organistion, it is for the most part unsucessful in its desired aims which could explain the quick dominance and accepted popularity of Da’wat-e-Islāmī, their Baraylawī counterparts.

    The Baraylawīs have the Da’wat-e-Islāmī, which was founded in 1980 by a senior Baraylawī cleric, Mowlānā Ilyās Qādirī. Da’wat-e-Islāmī is a non-political international Islamic propagation movement. Its principle objective is simply to preach and guide Muslims to act upon the teachings of the Qurān and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (‘alayhis salātu was-salām) and kindling their hearts with the compassionate love of Prophet Muhammad (‘alayhis salātu was-salām).

    This group has a strict dress code and emphasises Muslims to base their lives on the Qurān and Sunnah. Members are recognised by the beautifully wrapped green turbans on their heads.

    This group has rapidly grown considering when it was founded and today it is one the largest Muslim groups in the world with millions of followers, subscribers and admirers.

    It would not be useless or bias to note here that in contrast with the Tablīgī Jamā’at, Da’wat-e-Islāmī seems to be successful in its aims and looks to be growing faster than expected.

    Da’wat-e-Islāmī has also launched its official website which contains amongst many features, an extensive media library, a large online book library and a global prayer time calculator. The link is http://www.dawateislami.net/

    In any case, the above-mentioned information portrays that both the Deobandīs and the Baraylawīs have very large international Islamic propagation movements who act as missionary wings.

    Finally, the Deobandīs and Baraylawīs each have their own governing bodies, which govern all Islamic schools under their control and implement a very biased and sectarian curriculum.

    The Deobandī Central Board of Education is called “Waqaf al-Madāris” which requires all Deobandī controlled schools to implement its curriculum and whereas the Baraylawī Central Board of Education is known as “Tanzīm al-Madāris Ahl-e-Sunnat” which requires all Baraylawī controlled schools to implement its curriculum. The Deobandī Board is located, & has its centre in Multān (Pakistan) whereas the Baraylawī Board is located, & and has its centre in Lāhore (Pakistan).

    The appropriate question should be, can the Deobandīs and Baraylawīs UNITE?

    …Imagine – yes imagine – if the JUP AND JUI of Pakistan were ONE under the MMA.

    …Imagine if prominent and influential political and religious Deobandī and Baraylawī leaders stood under ONE umbrella.

    …Image if Deobandī and Baraylawī schools in the subcontinent had the same governing curriculum body.

    …Imagine if the Tablīgī Jamā’at and Da’wat-e-Islāmī made an alliance!

    …Imagine the intellectual, religious, political and spiritual might an alliance would bring!

    …Imagine! Imagine! Imagine! Nothing is impossible as the optimist once said!

    The implications would be DEVASTATING to the enemies of Islām. Two of the world’s largest and influential groups speaking in ONE VOICE. This would shake the foundations – nay destroy the very dreams of infidelity and polytheism.

    I sincerely pray to Allāh Ta’ālā – for it is only He who can make such dreams appear in the world of reality.

    (Note: if you come across any grammatical, spelling or factual errors, then please do notify my, thank you. Also, please feel free to disagree as long as the respect is maintained).
     

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