The question then follows, if that is indeed the position of alahazrat, that are we to accept the division of kalam nafsi and kalam lafdhi as elucidated upon by the mutakallimin? @abu Hasan if you are able to shed some light on this important matter it would be very appreciated, جزاكم الله خيرا
After having read the risalah anwar al-mannan fi tawhid al-qur'an, it seems that alahazrat differs with the mutakallimin of ahl al-sunnah regarding the issue of kalam nafsi and kalam lafdhi, he seems to refute them heavily for splitting the kalam of Allah into two and asserts that it is one.
as-salamu alaikum, I was reading this article I found [see: History of Muslim Philosophy ] and it attributed the following view to Imam Maturidi: the reference cited is as follows: [44] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 26-28; Tawilat, Surahs ix, 6; xlii, 51; vii, 143; iv, 164.
THE ATTRIBUTE OF SPEECH Excerpted from “A commentary on the creed of Islam:Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazani on the creed ofNajm al-Din al-Nasafi” [Edited by Austin P. Evans] And Speech, He speaks with a kind of Speech which is one of His attributes, from all eternity, not of the genus of letters and sounds. It is an attribute incompatible with silence and defect Allah speaks with this attribute, commanding, prohibiting, and narrating. The Qur’än, the Speech of Allah, is uncreated and it is written in our volumes, preserved in our hearts, recited by our tongues, heard by our ears, [yet] is not a thing residing in them. And Speech (kalam)/ It is an attribute from eternity which is an expression for that context composed of letters called the Qur’ãn. [78] [This is similar to] any one of us [who] whenever he commands, prohibits, and narrates finds of himself an idea and then indicates it by an expression or by writing or by a gesture. This attribute is something other than the attribute of Knowledge, since a man may narrate something which he knows not [be a fact], but rather knows the contrary to it. This attribute is an attribute different from Willing, for one may command something he does not will, like the person who commands his slave to do something in order to reveal his disobedience and insubordination. This kind of speech is called “speech of the mind” (kalam nafsi)[1]. Al-Akhtal[2] referred to this kind of speech in saying: Verily speech is in the heart,And the tongue has been made only as a guide to the heart. And ‘Umar—.--may Allah be well pleased with him—said, “Verily, I made a saying right and sound in myself.”- And often you say to your friend, “Verily there is speech within me, which I wish to relate to you.” The proof for the establishment of the attribute of Speech is the Agreement (ijmã’) of the Muslim people [79] and mutawãtir traditions from the prophets, which assert that Allah is a Speaker since it is certain that speaking is impossible without the attribute of Speech being established. It has been established that Allah has eight attributes[3]: Knowledge, Power, Life, Hearing, Seeing, Willing, Creating, and Speech. And since the last three are more open to dispute and more obscure, he again referred to their being established as sure and eternal and went into some detail in his statement of the fact that they are firmly established. So al-Nasafi said, He/ that is, Allah, speaks with a kind of Speech which is one of His attributes / Of necessity it is impossible to affirm the derivative of anything without affirming the subsistence in that thing of the source of its derivation. In this way al-Nasafi refuted the Mu’tazilites[4], inasmuch as they took the position that Allah is a Speaker of Speech which subsists in something other than Himself, and is not one of His attributes. from all eternity / Of necessity it is impossible that originated things subsist in His essence. not of the genus of letters and sounds / Of necessity letters and sounds are originated accidents, the occurrence of some of which is conditioned on the fact that others have been finished. By immediate perception we know that it is impossible to pronounce the second letter [ a word] without finishing off the first letter. This is a refutation of the Hanbalites[5] and the Karramites, who say that the Speech of Allah is an accident of the genus of sounds and letters, and yet in spite of that it is eternal. It / that is, Speech is an attribute / that is, an idea subsistent in the essence incompatible with silence / which is the leaving off of speech while yet having the power to speak and defect / This is the lack of fitness in the organs of speech either because of the nature created within one, as in the case of dumbness, [80] or because of weakness and immaturity, as in infancy. Objection may be made that this definition applies to uttered speech only, in contrast to speech of the mind, since silence and dumbness are incompatible with verbal utterance only. To this we answer that the meaning here is internal silence and internal defect, so that one neither desires utterance within himself nor is capable of it. So just as Speech is of both kinds, uttered and in the mind, so also is its contrary; I mean by that silence and dumbness. Allah speaks with this attribute, commanding, prohibiting, and narrating / This means that Speech is a single attribute[6] with a variety of forms for commanding, prohibiting, and narrating that differ according to the matters with which Speech is connected.[7] In this, Speech is analogous to Knowledge, Power, and the rest of the attributes. Each of them is a single eternal attribute, but variety and origination occur only in making connections and adding relationships, inasmuch as that is more fitting to the perfection of the unity of Allah. And there is no proof that each attribute has variety within itself. Objection may be raised that these things [such as commanding, prohibiting, and narrating] are divisions of Speech, without which it is unreasonable to think of the existence of Speech. We reply that this is impossible, nay rather, that Speech becomes one of these divisions only when the connections [originated things] are made. This is true of Speech which does not pass away, but in the beginning from all eternity there was no division whatsoever. [And some took the position that from all eternity Speech was narrative (khabar) and that all other kinds of Speech go back to it. They say that the result of the command is to give the information (al-ikhbãr) that performing the act deserves reward and failure to do it deserves punishment; and that prohibition is just the opposite of this; and the result of asking for information (al-istikhbar) is the narrative which comes from seeking to be instructed; and the result of summoning is the narrative which comes from seeking a response. Answer may be made that of necessity we know there are differences in these - meanings, and the fact that some of them require the others does not demand their being united into one. Objection may be raised that command and prohibition without someone who is commanded or who is prohibited is a bit of foolishness and unreality, and that to say that from eternity there is on the part of Allah narration which assumes the past time is a pure falsehood from which Allah must be far removed. To this we reply that no difficulty results if His Speech is not made from eternity to be command, prohibition, and narrative. If we do make His Speech to be command, prohibition, and narrative, then the command from eternity is to compel the one commanded thereby to obtain it at the time he comes into existence and to make him fit to obtain it. It is sufficient then that there be in the knowledge of the one commanding the existence of the one to be commanded, which is analogous to a mans taking it for granted that he had a son, and then commanding him to do something after he should come into existence. Narration that refers to eternity is not described by any time at all, since with Allah there is no past, future, nor present, because He is far removed from all time, just as His Knowledge is eternal and is unchanged by the changing of times. And when al-Nasafi spoke explicitly of -Speech as being from eternity, he wanted to call our attention to the fact that this term “al-Qur’an” is some times applied to the eternal Speech of the mind just as it is applied to the originated context (al-nadhm) which is read, so he said, The Qur’an the Speech of Allah, is uncreated (ghayr makhluq) / al-Nasafi followed the term “al-Qur’an” with the words “the speech of Allah”- because - of what the Early Theologians had stated saying that the Qur’an is the uncreated Speech of Allah and not that the Qur’an is said to be uncreated. This distinction is made lest the mind jump to the conclusion that the thing composed of sounds and letters is eternal. This is just the position that the hanbali’s took out of ignorance and obstinacy. And al-Nasafi used “uncreated” instead of “un-originated” in order, first, to call attention to their oneness in meaning; second, to make his statement agree with the tradition in which the Prophet—may Allah bless and give him peace—said, “The Qur’an is the uncreated Speech of Allah, and whoever says that it is created is not a Believer in Allah the Majestic One,” and, third, to take into account the dispute between the two parties on the well-known subject of whether the Qur’an is created or uncreated[8]. So the whole question is to be interpreted as the question of the creation of the Qur’ãn. The verifying of this matter on which they and we differ goes back to whether or not the Speech of the mind can, be established. However, we do not say that the verbal expressions (al-alfaz) and letters are eternal, and they do not say that the Speech of the mind is originated. The proof for our position has already been stated, namely, that it is established by Agreement and mutawätir tradition of the prophets—may the blessing of Allah be on them—that Allah is a Speaker, the only meaning of which is that He has the attribute of Speech and that, since the subsistence in the essence of Allah of the verbal Speech which is described as originated is impossible, the Speech which is described as eternal and In the mind is designated as the attribute of Allah. The Mu’tazilites have inferred that the Qur’ãn is to be described by attributes which pertain to a created being and by marks which show its origination: that is, such things as its composition and arrangement, its having been brought down as a whole and then revealed bit by bit[9], its being in the Arabic language, its being heard by the ear of man, and its being rhetorical and inimitable and so on. All this only raises an argument against the position of the Hanbalites and not against us, for we admit that the arrangement of the Qur’ãn is originated. Our statement [the Qur’an being uncreated] has only to do with the Eternal Idea. Since the Mu’taziites were unable to deny that Allah speaks, they held that when He speaks it means that He brings into existence the sounds and letters their places or He brings into existence the written characters of the Preserved Tablet (al-lawh al-mahfüz)[10] which may or may not be read. They differed about this last point. You are well aware that the one who is moved is the one in whom the motion subsists and not the one who brings the motion into existence. Otherwise it would be sound for the Creator to be described with accidents which are created of Him. And Allah is far exalted above anything like that. One of the greatest ambiguities [regarding the Qur’an] according to the Mu’tazilites is stated by them as follows. You [people] are agreed that the Qur’an is the name for that which has been transmitted to us between the two covers of the volumes by tawãtur. Believing this requires that the Qur’an be written in the volumes, recited by the tongues of men, and heard by their ears. All these things are of necessity marks which indicate that the Qur’an was originated. So al-Nasafi pointed out the answer to this by saying, and it/ that is, the Qur’an, which is the speech of Allah is written in our volumes / that is, with written characters and with forms of letters which indicate it preserved in our hearts / that is, by verbal expressions which a imagined recited by our tongues / with letters which are pronounced and heard heard by our ears / and with these also [yet] is not a thing residing (haal) in them / He means to say that in spite of all this the Qur’an, the Speech of Allah, does not reside in the volumes, nor in the hearts, nor in the tongues, nor in the ears; but it is an Eternal Idea. subsisting in the essence of Allah. This Idea is expressed and heard by means of the context which indicates it, and preserved by the context which is imagined in the mind and is written by marks, by forms, and by characters which are used conventionally for the letters that indicate the Qur’an. This is analogous to our saying that fire is a burning substance, which is recalled to mind by a verbal expression and is written down with a pen, but it does not follow that the real essence of fire is- a sound and a letter. The verifying of this fact is that a thing has a kind of existence in substances (al-ayan), another kind of existence in minds (al-adhhan), another in an expression (al-’ibara), and still another in writing (al-kitaba). The writing indicates the expression, the expression indicates what is in the mind, and it in turn indicates what is in the substance. So whenever the Qur’an is described as one of the things inseparably connected (lawäzim) with the Eternal, as when we say that the Qur’an is uncreated, the meaning is its true existential essence in external reality. Whenever it is described as that which is inseparably connected with things created and originated, the verbal expressions which are spoken and heard are meant, as when we say, “I have recited half the Qur’ãn,” or the expression imagined in the mind as when we say, [ “I have memorized the Qur’an,” or the characters that are written down are meant as when we say, “It is unlawful for one who is defiled to touch the Qur’än.” And since that which is indicated in the legal judgments by the term “Qur’ãn” is the verbal utterance (al-lafz) and not the Eternal Idea, the Imams in fundamental matters of dogma defined it as that which is written in the volumes and transmitted by tawãtur. And they applied the name [Qur’an] both to the context and the Idea; that is, they applied it not only to the Idea, but to the context as well, in so far as it indicates the Idea. In regard to the Eternal Speech which is an attribute of Allah, al-Ash’ari took the position that it was possible for it to be heard; and al-Ustãdh Abü Ishaq al-Isfarã’ini[11] denied it. Abu Mansur [al-Maturidi][12] also chose this [latter] position. The meaning of the saying of Allah, “Until he hears the speech of Allah” (Qur’an 9:6) is that he heard that which indicates it, which is analogous to one’s saying, “I hear the knowledge of So-and-so.” So Moses[13] heard a sound which indicated the Speech of Allah, but since it was without the means of a book or an angel, Moses was given the special name of. “interlocutor” (al-kalim).[14] Objection may be raised that were the Speech of Allah really in an Eternal Idea and metaphorically in a constructed context, then it would be sound to deny Speech of Allah, by saying that the inimitable (al-mu’jiz) context which, was sent down from above bit by bit and divided into sura’s and verses is not the Speech of Allah. But the Agreement [the Muslim people] opposes this last statement. Also it may be objected that if the inimitable thing which was an object of contention[15] in recitation were in reality the Speech of Allah, it would be positively certain that this can only he conceived of the context which was composed and divided into suras, since there would have been no meaning to their opposing the Eternal attribute of Speech. To this we reply that the verifying of this is to be found in the tact that the Speech of Allah is a name common to two things. In the first place it applies to the Eternal Speech of the mind—the idea conveyed by the relationship here in the phrase “Speech of Allah” is that it is’ an attribute of Allah—and in the second place it applies to the Speech which is originated and to verbal utterance, composed of sums and verses—the idea conveyed by the relationship [Speech to Allah] here is that it is created by Allah and not one of the compositions of His creatures. So denial of the Eternal Speech as suggested above is not at all sound. That which is inimitable and over which they contended can only be the Speech of Allah. The claim made by some of the Early Theologians that this expression is metaphorical does not mean that it is the conventional usage applied to the context which has been composed, but rather it means that in being verified as a reality and in essence the Speech is the name of the Idea, which subsists in the mind. Giving the verbal utterance the name [“Speech of Allah”) and making it the conventional usage for this Idea are only results of its indicating the Idea. So there is no dispute with them about the conventional usage of the word and giving it this name. Some of the Verifiers (al-muhaqiqun)[16] maintained that the Early Theologians used the term “the Speech of Allah” as an eternal Idea. It was not something that was contrasted with the verbal utterance so that it meant that which is indicated and understood by the verbal utterance, but it was something in contrast to the substance itself. The meaning of the term was: that which does not subsist in itself like the rest of the attributes. They meant that the Qur’an, being eternal, is the name which is used for both the verbal utterance and the Idea and includes them both. This is not the position held by the Hanbalites, who maintained that the context[17] ‘which was composed and arranged in parts is eternal. We know by immediate perception that it is positively impossible for one to pronounce the “s” (sin) of bism ‘illãhi with out first pronouncing the “b” (bã’). But they mean that the verbal expression which subsists in the mind is not arranged in parts [ after the other] in His mind like that which subsists in the mind of the one who has memorized it, without any arrangement of parts and without some of it preceding other parts. The arrangement takes place only when one gives expression to it in utterance or when one reads without using the organ [of speech]. This is the explanation of their statement, “That which is read is eternal, but the reading is originated.” But that Speech which subsists in the essence of Allah has no arrangement of parts, so that whoever hears His Speech hears it without any arrangement of parts, for He needs no organ [of speech]. This is the conclusion to be reached from the statement of the Verifiers. It is well for one then to conceive the Speech of Allah as verbal expression, subsistent in the mind, not composed of letters either uttered or imagined, since it is stipulated of these that the presence of some precludes the presence of others; nor is it composed of the characters which are arranged in order and which indicate it. And we do not conceive the speech which subsists in the mind of the one who has memorized it except as forms of letters which are stored up and inscribed in his imagination (khayal) so that if he turns to them, it becomes speech constructed of verbal expressions which are imagined, or of marks which are so arranged that whenever he gives utterance to them they become speech which is heard. [1] Kalaam nafsi, or hadith nafsi, is the ideas of the mind which do not need letters or words to express them. Enc. of Islam, I 671; Dict. of Tech. Terms, p. 1270; al-Fadali, Kifayat al-Awamm, pp. 63 ff.; A.J., pp. 120 f. [2] Al-Akhtal, an Arabian Christian poet, born about AD 640. A eulogy of the Umayyad regime, under which he flourished, is considered his masterpiece. He is remembered especially for his refusal for the khalifa’s offer that he become a muslim, and for the golden cross which he wore about his neck after the manner of the Arabian Christians. Enc. of Islam, I, 234 ff; Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, pp. 240 ff.; Brockelmann, Geschichichte, I, 49 ff. [3] This is the Maturidite position, since the Ash’arites omit the creating (takwin) see al-Razi, Muhassal; pp. 135 ff.; al-Iji, al-Mawaqif, pp. 71 ff. [4] This position of the Mu’tazilites regarding the Kalaam of Allah is also that of the, Shi’ites. The Kharijites like the Mu’tazilites said that the qur’an was created. The Murji’ites differed among themselves in the matter. Al-Ash’ari, Maqalat, pp. 124, 153; al-Bäbu al-Hãdi ‘Ashar, pp. 25 ff. [5] Cf. Enc. of Islam, I, i88 ff., II, 670 ff.; ibn Khallikan, Biographical Dictionary, I, 44 ff.; Macdonald, Development, pp. 157 f. [6] This is the orthodox position, which denies that speech should be divided into a variety of attributes corresponding to the various kinds of speech. See al-Razi Muhassal, p. 134; al-Iji al-Mawaqif, p. 68; ‘I.D., p. 8o. [7] ‘These are the connections- which according to the Mutakallims are the relationships between the Knower and the thing known, the Decreeing One and the thing decreed, etc. Because of the difficulty of explaining the real nature of the connection between Allah, the Eternal and Infinite One, and the originated things which exist through his Power and Will the Scholastic Theologians went more and more into great detail. Al-Fadali for example, enumerates seven distinct varieties of connections for the attribute of Power, and al-Bayjuri in his commentary says that al-Fadali omitted one and there should be eight connections for this one attribute. Al.Fadali, Kifiyat al-’Awãmrn, p. 44; Dict. of Tech. Terms, pp. 1014, 1o6I f.; See Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, pp. 127, 189. Al Ashari al-Ibãna, pp. 23 f. (Klein, al-Al-Ashaari’s Al-Ibãnah, pp. 6611.). [8] For the history of the conflict over the significance of the non-creation of the Speech of Allah, see Enc. of Islam, 11, 670 ff; Macdonald, Development, pp. 146 if.; Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, pp. 149 if.; Ibn Khaldün, Muqaddima, LIE, o if.; Ibn Hazm, Kitab al-Fisal, I 4 if. [9] Inzãl, tanzil, verbal nouns of the IV and II stems of nazala: the former means “sending down at one time or in general,” the latter is used for “sending down by degrees, or in Actuality.” The former is probably, says A.J. (p. 124), the sending down of the Qur’an from the Preserved Tablet (see note to) to the lowest heaven, the latter from there to the Prophet. Cf. Enc. of Islam, II, ao6 ff.; al-Kastali (Constantinople text), p. 92; i p. 7, Al-Baydawi, Anwãr al-Tanzil, I, 17 f. [10] The Preserved Tablet, according to the Multitude of the People of the law, is a body (jism) above the seventh heaven in which is Written all that has been and will be until the Day of Resurrection. With the Wise Men it is the Active intelligence and with the Philosophers it is the Universal Soul; and with the Sufi, it is the divine light. The Tablet is very often identified, however, with the original copy of the Qur‘an and is then identical with umm al-kitab. Dict. of Tech. Terms, The Dictionary of Islam, p. 285; Al-Baydawi, Anwãr al-Tanzil. 369 vol 2. [11] See Enc, of Islam, II, 48; Horten, Die phil. Systeme der spek, Theologen im Islam, pp. 556 f. [12] Abü Mansur Muhammad b. Mahmüd al-Maturidi, who came from a village in Samarqand called Maturid, was the leader of a reform in theology in the lands of the Trans-Oxus. Dying in A.H. 333 (A.D. 444), he was a contemporary of al-Ash’ari, who died in A.H. 324 (A.D. 935). Brockelmann, Geschichte, I, 195; ‘ID., p. 14. The differences between his position in dogmatic theology and that of al-Ash’ari have been well summarized in the book al-Rawda aI-Bahiya (see Brockelmann, Geschichte, I, 195) in Horten, Die phil. Systeme der spek, Theologen im Islam, pp. 531 ff; and also in Sayyid Murtada’s commentary on the Ihyã’ of al-Ghazza1i, II, 86 ff.; Enc, of islam, I, 309, and III, 414 f. [13] See Qur’an 4:162; Al-Baydawi, Anwãr al-Tanzil., I, 130, 241; al-Tabari, Annales, I, 463 ff.; al-Tha’labi Qisas al-Anbiyã’, pp. 174 ff.; Macdonald, .Development p. 149. [14] Enc. of Islam, II, 699; Fleishber, Kleinere Schriftenen, II, 772. [15] See Qur’an 2:21; Al-Baydawi, Anwãr al-Tanzil, 1, 36. [16] A “verifier” was a term sometimes applied to many of the latter scholastic theologians like: al-Razi, al-Tusi, al-Isfara’ini [17] A.J. (p. 128) reads lafz “verbal expression,” instead of nazm.
