jabr, free will and qadar

Discussion in 'Aqidah/Kalam' started by abu Hasan, Mar 19, 2021.

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  1. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    the reason i refuse to engage with the deranged maniac should be obvious by now. he does not understand basic english constructs; he says something, claims something else and is blissfully unaware of his own self-contradictions. he puts words in others' mouth and tries to refute them but still calls anything he pleases as a 'strawman'. and still, he wants me to refute him using "logical syllogism".

    he is incapable of citing any arabic text himself, but will conveniently copy MY arabic citation from sanusiyah footnotes and use the translation he prefers to give the impression that he is 'quoting' from an arabic text. he is utterly shameless, utterly ignorant and undoubtedly a jabri whether he realises or not.

    inad and mukabarah are bad traits. we seek Allah's refuge.

    if you are not capable of reading books of aqidah/kalam in original arabic you should not be arguing in this subject, especially when your sources are severely limited to blog posts in english.

    that is my observation - but anyone can examine the thread and decide for themselves.

    one can see how he loves to post the same limited stuff over and over again (which he does not understand either). that is the mablagh of his ilm. and apparently my posting translations is 'shoddy exposition' compared to his eloquent and precise arguments.

    i created his own thread for this purpose - let him have a go to his heart's content. but if people stop responding to him - or stop feeding the troll - he will stop littering. it is just that we should resist the urge to answer him. if this were any other issue, i would have stopped answering him after one or two exchanges - but unfortunately, this is a delicate topic and there is very little on this in english. and i feared that someone may be misled and hence, i started this thread.

    as you have seen (and will see, in sha'Allah), these will be translations from masters of kalam. whosoever fears for his aakhirah, may heed them.

    wa billahi't tawfiq.

    ===
    @ramiz.noorie : khalq af'al al-ibad is imam bukhari's well known work.

    https://archive.org/details/waq64511/00_64511

    i may post from it, but right now the agenda is mostly ash'ari works. and sunnis who are interested in learning about this issue, may follow this.

    ===
    in sha'Allah, we will stick to our course and will try not be distracted.
     
    Last edited: Apr 3, 2021
  2. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    Sawi 5/n

    -------------------------------
    Actions, deeds of the Slave and Different Opinions Concerning the Issue

    {According to us, the slave has acquisition, kasb}: The objective is to explain this issue according to the creed of Ahl al-Sunnah concerning deeds of men [afáāl al-íbād] and refutation of Mútazilah and Jabriyyah.

    The Jabriyyah say: The slave is compelled [majbūr] externally and internally. He is like a thread hanging in the air. They reject responsibility [taklīf] and the reason for sending Messengers. And they say: “Allāh’s punishment of sinners is oppression”.

    The Mútazilah say: The slave is free to choose [mukhtār] externally and internally. He creates his own voluntary deeds [ikhtiyāriyyah]. Because, if it were otherwise, the [creation] of the deed belongs to Allāh, then His punishment for sins would be oppression.

    Both the above opinions are invalid.

    The Ahl al-Sunnah say: The slave has [two kinds of actions; and the first of which is:] involuntary actions. [idtirariyyah] Such as falling from a mountain, or the movement of someone shivering. There is absolutely no responsibility [of the slave] in such actions – everyone agrees that these are Acts of Allāh and a corollary of this is, acts done under coercion [ikrāh]. [1]

    The [second is]: voluntary actions. [ikhtiyariyyah]

    This is also the action [fiýl] of Allāh, however this is only in bringing it into existence [iyjād] and attributed to the slave because of his acquisition [kasb].

    Kasb is the relation of the [created] power of the slave [qudratu’l ábd] and his [created] will [iradah] to do that action [fiýl].

    The greatness of the Divine Power of Allāh is that the action is brought into existence [iyjād al-fiýl] near to the power of the slave – not [directly] by His own Power and Will.

    This is like the cutting of a knife – the [act of] cutting is when the knife moves, not within the knife itself; and it is possible for it to be contrary to it. The [created] power of the slave [qudratu’l ábd] and his [created] will coincides with the bringing into existence by Allāh [īyjād] and this is named: acquisition [kasb].


    ---
    {but it has no influence}: the slave does not have influence [in the creation or the eventual effect] of his voluntary action.[2]


    ---
    {thus, let it be known} the final alif in fa’l tárifā is replacement for nūn of emphasis [nūn al-tawkīd] because it comes after fat’ĥ and in a state of stopping as Ibn Mālik has said:

    And change it after the final alif that comes after fat’ĥ
    Which stops as you would say for qifan, qifā
    This is from the copy [of Jawharah] which includes the author's amendment in the final version; however, his commentary is based on the older version, which was in circulation at that time and in which he says:

    And near us, the slave has acquisition, and for which he is burdened with responsibility [kullifā]
    However, that exerts no influence (in creating the action), thus you should know [faárifā]

    [Al-Laqānī said:] “The only reason I have not used [the amended version] for the commentary is because I do not have the original with me.” He said so because he had corrected it [in the final version].

    This is because in the amended version, he has explicitly negated influence as a refutation of adversaries from the outset, instead of modifying it with a clause [istidrāk; i.e., lākin]. Thus, the amended version eliminates a seeming ambiguity that may arise from such a modifier, and may cause the reader to doubt whether it was an affirmation or a negation. And so the reader should not misunderstand ‘acquisition’ [kasb] and take it to mean ‘influence.’ In the terminology of kalām scholars, ‘acquisition' [kasab] does not mean ‘influence’ or ‘effect’ [ta’thīr].

    {He is not compelled} The explicit refutation of Jabriyyah and Mútazilah starts here, even though it is implicitly refuted in the previous couplet – {and according to us, the slave has acquisition and therefore held responsible} is the refutation of Jabriyyah and {but he does not influence in it} is the refutation of Mútazilah. The scholars of this science like to elaborate [so there is no scope for ambiguity].

    {he does not have choice} [3] this clause is a prefixed by a negative which negates the ‘not’ – and the negation of a negative results in a positive [i.e. it is a double negative]. [4] Thus here, it means: “the human/slave is not compelled; rather, he does have a choice”.

    {But he does not create any of his actions}: It is obligatory to believe also that the slave does not bring into existence [iyjād] his voluntary action. It is actually an acquisition [kasb] as you have learned. This is the refutation of the Mútazilah who say: “Indeed, the slave creates his own voluntary actions” and based on this they derived many corollaries, which are invalid and untrue.

    For example

    If they say: “If these were the creation of Allāh – as you claim – then the punishment of Allāh of the slave is oppression.

    We say
    : The punishment is related to partial free-will [juz’ al-ikhtiyārī] and that is acquisition of that action [kasb].

    They ask: Who created acquisition [kasb]?

    We
    reply: It was created by Allāh – and none can ask Allāh táālā about what He does.

    They say: If the action was that of Allāh [i.e. in the creation of that action], then He would be attributed with that action – and it is not befitting His Majesty. For example, if He created disbelief in a human, this would necessitate that Allāh be named ‘kāfir’ and no one says this. [al-íyādhu billāh]

    We
    reply: The attribution is to that upon which it is acted, not the one who does that action. [qā’im bi’l mafúūl lā bi’l fāýil]. Do you not see people and colours – these are from His actions, but not subsist with Him.​

    ====

    There are rational and narrated (textual) proofs that refute them.

    The textual proof is from the Qur’ān; Allah taala says:

    Allāh has Power over all things” [Sūrah Al-Baqarah, v284]

    And He created every thing and ordained for it a [proper] measure” [Sūrah Al-Furqān, v2]

    The Rational proof is: If the slave was the creator of his own actions, then he would be required to have detailed knowledge of his own actions – but since the pre-requisite [lāzim] is invalid, therefore the consequence [malzūm] is also invalid. [5] Also, if he were the creator of his own actions, he would be a partner with Allāh in His Actions.

    In conclusion:

    a) Our involuntary actions [iđţirāriyyah] are created by Allāh táālā; and every one agrees with this point [including adversaries].

    b) So also our voluntary actions [ikhtiyāriyyah] [are created by Allāh]; except that the slaves have in their voluntary actions, an inclination [mayl] and disposition [tawajjuh] [to do that action or not] and this is known as ‘acquisition’ [kasb] – and upon this rests [an individual’s] responsibility [taklīf].​

    ==================
    Footnotes:

    1. [Dr. Ábdu’l Fattaĥ al-Bazm:] It is necessary to consider this word ‘under coercion’ carefully. Indeed, when one does a [prohibited] action under coercion [ikrāh], it will not be deemed a sin. However, we cannot say that the person who acted under duress did not do it with his choice [ikhtiyār] – in fact, he does it by his own free will [ikhtiyār] when he executes the order of the person forcing him to do it, to avoid harm, such as being killed for example.

    2. [Dr. Ábdu’l Fattaĥ al-Bazm:] The absence of influence in the effect of the action by person in a voluntary action is analogous to a person joining two live electric wires – there will be sparks when they touch each other; the sparks were not by the influence of the person making the contact. Indeed, the person’s ACT brought about the sparks but the person did not have influence in the appearance of those sparks. [Dr. Ábdu’l Fattaĥ al-Bazm]

    3. Lit. So neither is he compelled and does not have a choice // nor is is he the creator of his own actions.

    4. When two negatives are used in one independent clause, in standard English the negatives are understood to cancel one another and produce a weakened affirmative: this is known as litotes. [Wikipedia]

    5. Since humans do not have detailed knowledge of their own actions – especially that which will happen, this negates the human being the creator of his own action [malzūm].

    ======================================
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    Last edited: Apr 7, 2021
  3. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    Sawi 4/n

    ---------------

    Being Blessed and Wretched According to Ashárīs and Māturīdīs [sáādah, shaqāwah]

    {The Success of the Blessed near Him} According to Ashárīs, it is necessary to believe that being blessed [sáādah] and wretched [shaqāwah] are [written in] pre-eternity. Righteousness and Islām are indicators of being blessed; sins and disbelief [kufr] are indicators of being wretched and doomed. The end [state in which one dies] proves what was actually [written] earlier.

    If a man dies on kufr, it proves that in pre-eternity he was [written] among the wretched [ashqiyā’a].

    If he dies on faith [īymān], it proves that in pre-eternity he was [written] among the blessed [suádā].

    However the ‘indicators’ can be contradictory as it has been mentioned in the ĥadīth [1]:
    Indeed, one of you will do deeds that are deeds of the dwellers of Paradise, and will keep doing them until they are so close to it that the distance between them is only but an arm’s length, but the Written [kitāb] will take over and they will start doing deeds of the people of Hell and then enter it.

    Indeed one of you will do deeds of the dwellers of Hell, and will be doing so until they are so close to it that the distance bwteen them is only but an arm’s length, but the Written [kitāb] will take over and they will start doing acts of the people of Paradise and then enter it.
    ”​

    According to Māturīdīs, being blessed [sáādah] is Islām itself; and being wretched [shaqāwah] is kufr itself. Thus, if he dies upon kufr, his state of being blessed [sáādah] changed over to being wretched [shaqāwah]; and if a kāfir accepts Islām by the time he dies, his shaqāwah has been converted to sáādah.

    This difference of opinion is also semantic. Because, what matters is the end, the final state according to both schools, and the difference is only in how they name it:

    The Ashárīs say: Islām is an indicator of being blessed, not being blessed per se; kufr is an indicator of being wretched/doomed, and not being doomed per se. And the [final] state of being blessed or wretched will not change, as they are from pre-eternity.

    The Māturīdīs say: Islām and kufr are being blessed and being wretched respectively. Thus, the state of the blessed and the wretched can change.​

    This leads to the validity of the saying: “I am blessed if Allāh Wills” according to Ashárīs.

    The Māturīdīs say that the above statement is invalid.[2]

    {and then, will not change}: that is, nobody’s state will change from that which is Written [taĥattama lahu; made necessary] for them; because of its relation with Divine Knowledge; and if it could change, then knowledge would turn over into ignorance.


    =================
    footnotes:

    1) Bukhārī, #3208, #3332, #6594, #7474; Muslim, 2643 reporting from Ábdullāh ibn Masúūd. Also in Abū Dāwūd, #4708, Tirmidhī, #2138; Ibn Mājah, #76; Imām Aĥmad in his Musnad, 1/382, 414, 430.

    2) According to Māturīdīs, one should say: “I am certainly a believer” “I am certainly blessed” so the statement does not have ambiguity and hints of uncertainty. Istithnā or exception, here means: to add ‘If Allāh Wills’.


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    Mohammed Ali and Noori like this.
  4. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    my apologies for delay. someone has been littering in the other thread. the poor fellow does not know the difference between iradah and ikhtiyar and iyjad and khalq; and keeps falsely accusing us of what he himself does. anyway, i will continue to post here from translations - and guidance is with Allah ta'ala.

    ===
    Sawi 3/n (this is not the main discussion, but i have included it here for completion and also because it mentions that falsehood is impossible in Divine Speech)

    ---
    Promise of Reward and Punishment [waád, waýīd] and Differing Opinions

    {He will certainly fulfill his promise for those He Wills to Reward} This couplet denotes that Allāh táālā will absolutely not renege on His Promise to righteous believers [ţāýiyīn] that He will give them Paradise.

    “This is the Promise of Allāh; and Allāh will not renege on His Promise.” [1]

    “Indeed, Allāh will not renege on His Promise.” [2]

    The Promise of Allāh – Glory be to Him – is according to His Pre-eternal Knowledge [fī ílmihi azalan]; if it was permissible for Him to renege on His Promise [takhalluf al-waád], then ‘Knowledge’ would turn over into ‘ignorance’ and this would necessitate falsehood in the information [khabar] given by Allāh táālā and both [i.e., ignorance and falsehood] are impossible for Allāh táālā.

    As for the Promise of punishment to the disbeliever – even in this case, there will be no contravening this promise as Allāh táālā has Himself said:

    “And my Word Will not change.” [3]

    “And those who disbelieve, for them is the fire of Hell [jahannam] and neither will death come to them so they may die.”[4]

    However, concerning His Promise to punish [waýīd] sinful Muslims: the Ashárīs and Māturīdīs differed upon this issue.

    The Ashárīs say: They are subject to His Wish [mashī’ah] – If He Wishes, He will forgive them; if He Wishes otherwise, He will punish them. The author/poet [Laqānī] has said in a couplet [#116] which will come later:

    116. And he who dies, and has not repented from his sins
    His case is deferred to Allāh [if He so Wills, He forgives; else, He punishes]

    The Māturīdīs say: The Promise of punishment is like that of the Promise of reward: neither will be reneged upon. They cite the verses that are generic with an aspect of specific exception of believers who will be forgiven; so these can also be interpreted as apparently generic verses but intended to be specific.

    Thus the foregoing [khulf al-waýīd] is merely semantic.

    The Ashárī Position: It is possible to do contrary to the threat of punishment; i.e., for those whom Allāh does not Wish to punish.

    The Māturīdī Position: It is no possible to do contrary to the promise of punishment; i.e. for those whom such a promise of punishment is certain.

    According to the opinion of our shaykh, the Emir, [5] one should say: It is dependent upon the Wish [mashī’ah] [6] – It is possible that all the sinners can be forgiven. If we have to consider this as a special case [makhşūş], inevitably there has to be a generic provision. [7] Because the special case does not apply to every case (all-encompassing, istighrāq) “a special case (or an exception) that applies to every single case is invalid” [it does not remain an ‘exception’ anymore]. If it applied to every case, then it would be an abrogation of the other ruling and negation of it – and cannot be referred to an ‘exception’.

    This proves that the difference of opinion is actual [and not merely semantic].

    The statement: “Inevitably the promise of punishment will be executed even if it is a single (sinner)” as it will appear further [#117] in the author’s [Al-Laqānī] statement, is according to the Māturīdī opinion:

    117. It is necessary [wājib] that punishment will be given to some who commit
    An enormity (a major sin) ...

    However, according to Ashárīs it is correct to seek forgiveness for every believer without exception.

    The conclusion is:
    a) The promise [of reward; waád] for the righteous will certainly not be reneged upon. Because it is related to the Knowledge of Allāh, and the Narrated Proof [dalīl samýī]; if it were possible for such a promise to be unfulfilled [takhalluf], then the ‘Knowledge’ of Allāh would be turn over into ignorance – and this would necessitate falsehood in the Speech of Allāh.

    b) Similar is the case with Promise of punishment [waýīd] of the disbelievers.

    c) As for the promise of punishment for sinners – this is dependent upon the Wish of Allāh [mashī’ah; i.e., to forgive or not] as you are well aware.​

    If you object: “Indeed Allāh will forgive all the sins” [8] – this would necessarily mean that He will do contrary to His promise.

    I answer
    : This is not [absolute, but is] restricted by the other verse: “Indeed Allāh will not forgive associating partners to Him [shirk]; and He will forgive anything else than that, for whomsoever He Wishes”.[9]

    This proves that forgiveness of sinful muslims depends on His Wish [to forgive or not] and this is the truth and correct opinion [ĥaqq].


    ================
    1. Sūrah Rūm, 6

    2. Sūrah Raád, 31

    3. Sūrah Al-Qāf, 29

    4. Sūrah al-Faţir, 36

    5. Shaykh Muĥammad ibn Muĥammad al-Sanbāwī al-Azharī al-Mālikī, known as Al-Amīr [= the prince] because his grandfather was an Emir/ruler of a province in Upper Egypt [1154-1232 AH]. He is originally from Al-Maghreb

    6. Some scholars say that mashī’ah and irādah are one and the same attribute.

    7. In other words, there is a generic provision from which there is a special case or exception.

    8. Sūrah Al-Zumar, 35

    9. Sūrah Al-Nisā’a, 48 and 116



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    Last edited: Mar 31, 2021
  5. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    Sawi 2/n

    Success and Disgrace is from Allāh [tawfīq and khidhlān]

    {He Gives Guidance / muwaffiq }: among [means] of success [or guidance; i.e. tawfīq] is that Allāh táālā created the power to obey, that beckons a person towards it [i.e. obedience; ţāáh] according to Imām al-Ĥaramayn. So ‘power’ according to him means: ‘the preservation of means and tools’.

    Based on the [premise] that the accident spans over two different periods, the kāfir does not have guidance [ghayr muwaffaq] due to the non-existence of this “beckoner” [al-dāýiyah] as evidenced by the verse: “Whomsoever Allāh Wills to Guide, He opens his heart [lit. expands his chest] for Islām.” That is, He will create for him, the [means that] beckon, inclination towards and love of Allāh táālā.

    Imām Abu’l Ĥasan al-Ashárī says: [Tawfīq] means that Allāh Creates the power in the slave to do good deeds [ţāáh]; and by “power”, he means: the accident[1] [árađ] that is adjoined with that good deed, based on the [premise] that the accident does not span over two different periods.

    [árađ: the impetus that is accompanies the production of the action; therefore, the accident or árađ does not span two periods as said by Imām al-Haramayn]

    Objection on the above: that if it is [present] before the good deed of the mukallaf [responsible, liable] this entails that the powerless is burdened with responsibility.

    My answer: Tawfiq is dependent on the intactness of the means and tools [asbāb, ālāt]; the conclusion is that the contravention from the perspective of responsibility [taklīf] is semantic; because everyone agrees that responsibility depends upon the intactness [salāmah] of means and tools.

    Whether such intactness can be called as “power” or not? This is an actual issue. Imām al-Ĥaramayn says that the means can be named ‘power’; and Imām Abu’l Ĥasan al-Ashárī says that they cannot be named ‘power’ [qudrah]; rather ‘power’ is that accident [árađ] that accompanies the good deed.

    [Şāwī:] Imām Ĥaramayn’s position is correct in this issue.

    {for those whom He wishes that they reach} i.e., those whom He Wills that they reach Him; attain His Love and Divine Pleasure.

    {Disgraces} khidhlān = disgrace, wretchedness, doom; lit. forsaking, abandoning; this is the opposite of tawfiq. And shortly we will see the difference of opinion of Al-Ashárī and Imām al-Ĥaramayn.[2]


    ===================
    [1] The impetus, stimulus [ĥarakah] that accompanies the creation of that action; therefore the accident does not span two periods.

    [2] According to Imām al-Ĥaramayn, Allāh táālā created the ‘power’ to commit sin AND that which beckons him [dāýiyah] towards sin. [Al-Irshad, pp. 254-255] However, Al-Ashárī says that only the ‘power’ to commit sin [lit. to disobey,māáşiyah] is created in the slave.

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    Last edited: Mar 28, 2021
  6. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    Sawi 1/n
    =====================
    these will be 3 or 4 posts being translation from Imam Sawi's commentary on jawharah. in brown is from jawharah. blue is the commentary.

    Shaykh Aĥmad ibn Muĥammad al-Mālikī al-Şāwī (d.1241 AH)

    =======================


    45.He is the Creator of the slave and all his actions (slave is a metaphor for the entire creation)
    He gives guidance to those whom He wishes that they reach (Him; i.e. Divine Pleasure)


    {He is the Creator of His slave and all his actions}

    Whether it is good or bad it is from Allāh. He is the creator of His ‘slave’, meaning everything in the creation. The meaning is Allāh is the creator of His slaves (i.e. creation) and everything that they do – whether good or evil – whether by their choice [ikhtiyār] or involuntarily [iđţrār]. The slave does not have any [power] except ‘inclination’ [mayl] when in a state of choosing [ĥālah al-ikhtiyār].

    It is therefore, tawbah is demanded [for his sins] and that he should abstain doing that action and be remorseful [on the committed sin]. And it is therefore, he deserves to be chastised and punished; given reward or punishment [thawāb, íqāb]. This is known as “acquisition” [kasb] as will be explained further. In contradistinction to the Mútazilah who say: “The slave creates his own voluntary actions” [afáāl al-ikhtiyāriyyah].

    First Objection: This is possible only in any of the following two cases: Either this ‘action’ was ‘obtained’ [ĥūşūl; or created] by the Power of Allāh; or by also the power of the slave at the same time.

    If the Mútazilah say: “Yes”.

    We reply: There are two Influencers to create a single effect. [mu’ath-thir, athar].

    If they say: “Only by the power of the slave”

    We reply: This necessitates that something has occurred in the universe forcibly against [the Will of] Allāh. [qahran álā Allāh]. This would necessitate that Allāh – Glory be to Him and Exalted is He – is not Alone in His Actions. But this is [patent] disbelief [kufr].


    Second Objection: If this action was his own [i.e created by the slave], then he should have knowledge of his own movements [or absence; ĥarakāt, sakanāt] in the future so long as he lives. Since he does not know, this is proof that he is impotent in creating his own actions.

    As for the Mútazilah’s objection concerning the position of Ahl al-Sunnah [i.e. Allāh táālā creates humans and their actions] necessitates oppression when Allāh punishes the sinner: This is invalid because “oppression” is defined as ‘dispensing in the dominion of others’ [taşarruf fī mulk al-ghayr].

    ----

    Anecdote:
    Qāđī Ábdu’l Jabbār ibn Aĥmad al-Mútazilī[1] was the Judge of Qazwīn. He entered the court of Ibn Ábbād, the minister of the Western Kingdom [maghrib][2] and he saw Master Abū Is’ĥāq al-Isfarā’inī, the imām of Ahl al-Sunnah, seated near him.

    Ábdu’l Jabbar said: “Glory be to Him who is Transcendent from [creating] Abominable things”

    The Sunnī imām understood his jab and said: “Glory be to Him, in whose Dominion – nothing happens except what He Wills.

    The Mútazilī responded: “Does the Lord-Almighty [rabb] Will that He be disobeyed?”

    The Sunni imām retorted: “Will the Lord-Almighty be disobeyed forcibly against His Will?"

    The Mútazilī said: “Do you not see? That if He prevented me from Guidance and Decreed for me the evil – did He do good to me or did He harm?”

    The Sunni imām replied: “If he prevented you from what is rightfully yours, He did harm; and if He prevented you from that which was originally His – He is the Lord-Almighty, the Owner [mālik] – and the Owner dispenses in His Dominions as He Wills”

    The meeting dispersed and the onlookers were surprised and they said: “This cannot be answered; by Allāh! this was, as if his mouth was stuffed with stones”

    Note: This is known as “Single Source of Action” [waĥdat al-afáāl] according to gnostics – meaning, the knower [áārif] does not behold an action except that he attributes it to Allāh [in reality]

    =================================


    [1] He was a judge and a prominent scholar of the Mútazilah in his time. Among his works are: Tanzīh al-Qur’ān án al-Maţāýin; Al-Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawĥīd wa’l Ádl. He died in Rayy [Tehran] in 415 AH. [Ţabaqāt al-Shāfiýīyyah, 3/97].

    [2] Ismāýīl ibn Ábbād, Abu’l Qāsim al-Ţāliqānī [326-385 AH] was a minister and was a patron of literature. He is the author of Al-Muĥīţ, Al-Kashf án Masāwī Shiýr al-Mutanabbī [Al-Iýlām, 1/316].


    sawi-jawhara, p230.png

    sawi-jawhara, p231.png

    sawi-jawhara, p232.png

    [sawi on jawharah, p.230-232]
     
  7. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    this was quoted and i don't know whether this is brother suraqah's comment or sh. foudeh's.

    sanusi,suraqah 1.png

    however, within itself, the above statement has no problem.

    ====

    - Allah's specification of something that is possible is in accordance with His knowledge.

    - because He does not specify any contingent thing with His Divine will - be it good or evil - except that He knows.

    - So every contingent thing that Allah knows will or will not "be", then that is His will.
    ====
    this should not be misunderstood to mean that a human has no choice; or extrapolate it to mean that it will happen ONLY because Allah had already Willed that it should happen that way. [go slow; read it a few times if you want].

    instead:

    1. Allah ta'ala KNEW in Pre-Eternity what zayd would do (His Knowledge is not dependent on zayd coming into existence first)

    2. According to His Knowledge, He Willed in Pre-Eternity to create that action and that would come into existence: according to the choice of zayd.

    3. This is what we mean when we say: Divine Will of Allah.

    ====
    I am not sure if it is the same footnote, but a similar footnote in Sh.Foudeh's book (tahdhib sharH al-sanusiyah p.45) and below follows my translation:

    [sanusi]: the reality of Divine Power [haqiqatu'l qudrah]: Divine Attribute, which is Pre-Eternal [azali] and by which any contingent thing is brought into existence [or created, iyjad]; or [remains in] nihility [iydam] according to Divine Will.
    sh. sayid adds the following annotation for the above statement:

    that is: the bringing into existence [iyjad] of Allah of a contingent thing or annihilation is according to the relation of Divine Will with it.

    because Allah ta'ala will not bring into existence or annihilate by His Divine Power except THAT which He Wills to be existent [wujud] or non-existent [adam] from continengent things.

    and by this, it is known that the pertinence [connection, linkage, talluq] of Divine Power is a corollary of the pertinence of Divine Will - that is it follows Divine Will and in the mind's eye: the relation to Divine Power comes after Divine Will.

    this 'following' is not chronological as some people imagine, it is just a concept that the mind cannot comprehend [yudrik] "Omnipotent" except one who has the "Will" - the affirmation of Divine Will is a rational condition to affirm Divine Power.


    tahdhib sanusi foudeh, p.45.png


    wAllahu a'alam.
     
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  8. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    so ta'alluq - pertinence. what is Divine Power or Knowledge concerned with?

    ---
    jawharah:

    34. Know that Divine Power is One and so also is (related to contingent)
    Divine Will and Divine Knowledge; but it is generic.

    35. (Because it) also includes necessary [wājib] and impossible [mumtaniý].
    And similar is Divine Speech, so this is what we follow.

    jawharah, 34-35.png

    ======
    The summary is that the tálluq – relation, pertinence, connection etc - of the following Divine Attributes is as follows:

    1. Divine Power & Divine Will:
    a) Related to every thing possible [mumkin]
    b) The relation to which it pertains is infinite and limitless
    c) It is single (there are not multiple ‘powers’)​

    2. Divine Knowledge & Divine Speech:
    a) Related to every thing possible [mumkin]
    b) The relation to which it pertains is infinite and limitless
    c) It is single (there are not multiple ‘powers’)​

    In addition to the three aspects mentioned above, Divine Knowledge and Divine Speech also include:
    d) Necessary (wājib); that is Allāh táālā Knows about and Speaks about His own Attributes.
    e) Impossible (mumtaniý / mustaĥīl); that is Allāh táālā Knows about and Speaks about things that are impossible to exist.​

    ====
    those who have read sub'han al-subbuH may recall this discussion in its introduction. it is very important to know these fundamental principles; else, one is sure to make an error.

    note: the above is MY summary; some people may not accept it, so here is the translation from al-Sawi's commentary:

    ----


    The connection or pertinence [tálluq] of Divine Knowledge


    {Divine Knowledge}: its pertinence towards the contingent [tálluq bi’l mumkināt] is similar to Divine Power; there is no limit for its relation, that it is single – however, it is not specific only to the contingent but its relation is all encompassing, generic [áām al-tálluq].



    · it is related to the contingent [mumkināt] by absolutely encompassing [iĥāţah] them and absolute knowledge [inkishāf]


    · it is related to the necessary [wājibāt] such as His Self [dhāt] and His Attributes [şifāt].


    · it is related to the impossible [mustaĥīlāt] such as flaws.


    The Knowledge of Allāh táālā about ‘things’ before they exist is Pre-Eternal; just as His Knowledge about necessary and impossible. [aH: just as He has/had knowledge about His Own Attributes, so also He has Knowledge of the actions of the creation even before they existed; it is not necessary that He Knows ONLY if He Willed it and otherwise it would be ‘unknowable’. Because, we know that His Attributes are not subject to His Will/irādah, but STILL He has Knowledge about them.]


    {general to that, all-encompassing}: i.e., all-encompassing concerning the contingent [mumkināt] as the author has indicated by the word: “contingent” [mumkin]. [aH: in the previous couplet, #33].



    {also general to the necessary/wājib}: i.e., like His Divine Essence (exalted is He), and His Attributes.



    {and impossible/mumtaniý}: i.e., in specifiying what is impossible.



    Because, the Knowledge of Allāh – Glory to Him and Exalted is He – concerns contingent, necessary and impossibilities – and the relation is Pre-Eternal Effectuation [tanjīzī qadīm] – and that it is not worthy of existence, nor will it ever come into existence [ĥudūth] – because if it WOULD, then it would necessitate ignorance – Far Exalted is Allāh from such a thing.


    sawi-jawhara, p204.png
     
  9. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    I wanted to summarise the terminology as one of the introductions in the thread. While I was looking at various commentaries (in my attempt to present the easiest first and leave the complex for later), I encountered a statement by a contemporary scholar in his commentary on Jawharah, Shaykh Nūĥ Álī Salmān al-Quđāt (1939-2010). I found this to be apt in our situation. In fact, I have been saying something like this in my posts in the other thread. Wa Billahi’t Tawfiq.

    Mukhtaşar al-Mufīd, p94.


    In the books of Tawĥīd (creed, theology), there are five topics that are interlinked. A non-specialist may not differentiate between them, which will lead him towards problematic conclusions.

    First: The Knowledge of Allāh – This was explained earlier that His Knowledge is Pre-Eternal [qadīm] and encompasses every thing [muĥīţun bi kulli shayy] and Allāh táālā KNOWS about things even before they occur [wuquú]; inevitably, that which occurs is according to the Knowledge of Allāh. Or you can say: “The Knowledge of Allāh is [accurate] according to what is going to happen”.


    Second: Creation of actions [khalq al-afáāl]. The madh’hab of Ahl al-Sunnah is that Allāh táālā is the Creator of actions, just as He is the Creator of all things.


    If a paper is placed in fire and if gets incinerated, the creator of combustion [al-iĥtirāq] is Allāh táālā. The attribution of burning [iĥrāq] towards humans or towards fire is superficial [majāz]. The proof is that when Sayyidunā Ibrāhīm álayhi’s salām was cast in the fire, he was not harmed [the fire did not burn him]; yet, his people are sinners because of their INTENTION to burn him.

    Third: The Basis of Recompense [manāţ al-jazā’a]: On what basis will the slave [human, jinn] be held to account? If the Knowledge of Allāh táālā is Pre-Eternal (i.e., it is already known by Allāh, what a human would do) and that He is the Creator of actions – what is the association of the slave with the actions that he is held to account for? We will see shortly that he will be held to account [yuĥāsab] for his choice of doing that action [ála ikhtiyarihi li’l afáāl].


    Fourth: Divine Decree [qađā’a]


    Fifth: Destiny [qadar].


    We will discuss the latter two shortly.

    mukhtasarmufid, p95.png
     
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  10. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    `awn al murid is a contemporary commentary on jawharah by shaykh abdu'l karim tattan and shaykh adib al-kilani (reviewed by shaykh wahbi ghawuji and shaykh abdu'l karim rifa'yi). even though this is further down in the plan, there is one paragraph that i felt needs to be mentioned in relation to bahar e shariat. i do not think any of the shaykhs afore-mentioned (contemporary syrian shaykhs) had read bahar e shariat or were translating it. yet this is what they had to say. [implication: it is thus understood by sunni ulama everywhere]

    `awn al-murid, p615:
    ===

    Indeed, the Knowledge of Allāh táālā is pre-eternal and true – concerning the dwellers of Paradise [ahl al-jannah] and dwellers of Hell [ahl al-nār] even before they [i.e. people] could do any action. It is obligatory to have faith in this; imāms like Mālik, Shāfiýī and Aĥmad have said that whoever disputes this [Pre-Eternal Knowledge] is a kāfir.

    It is obligatory to have faith [īymān] that Allāh táālā Knew, everything that is going to happen, even before it came into existence.

    The ĥadīth proves that when Allāh Knew that X [fulān] would be blessed [saýīd] and Y [fulān] would be damned [shaqī], He also Knew what the first [X] would do – i.e. good actions of blessed people that would take him to Paradise; and Knew what the second [Y] would do – i.e. evil actions of damned people that would usher him to Fire.

    Therefore it is invalid to claim: “Y is damned, even if he does not do anything.” And because Allāh ta’álā Knew that Y would do deeds of the People of Fire (i.e. lead him to Hell); inevitably this is in accordance with the Pre-eternal Knowledge of Allāh because the knowledge of his being damned [shaqāwah] and what he would [eventually] do are the same thing. One cannot happen without the other.

    Indeed, Allāh táālā Knew in Pre-Eternity (azalan) about what every human would do. So, He wrote [kataba] the actions of slaves according to His Knowledge related to their actions [which were not yet created]. Thereafter, these [actions] appeared in this world after it was created [dār al-taklīf]: i.e., the faith of a believer, the kufr of a disbeliever or the sin of the sinner.

    The Knowledge of Allāh did not compel [mujbaran]; nor did the writing [kitābah] compel either [for X or Y to do something] – because they were according to Divine Knowledge [of the unseen].

    Where is the compulsion [ijbār] in that which Allāh táālā wrote for us?

    It is therefore, that a believer merits [istaĥaqqa] a reward and a disbeliever [merits] punishment.


    ----

    awnmurid, p615.png

    ===
    a little later, it is written: (p 616)

    Imām Jaáfar al-Şādiq (may Allāh be pleased with him) was asked: “Are slaves [íbād] compelled?” He replied: “Allāh is Absolutely Just – He will not force or compel His slave to do a sin and then punish him for it”.

    awnmurid, p616a.png


    ---
    this is just one snippet. hold your horses.
     
  11. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    it is extremely important to understand the meaning of terms as explained by mutakallimun and as understood in the arabic language.

    the following terms ought to be described, explained and understood well to understand the discussion (all of these will be explained in the commentaries):

    qaDa
    qadar
    iradah
    jabr
    khalq
    kasb
    fiyl
    ikhtiyar
    sa'adah / sa'yid
    shaqawah / shaqi
    qudrah qadimah
    qudrah tanjizi
    wa'ad
    wa'yid
    tawfiq
    khidhlan
    and some more. it is also important to learn about the known differences between ash'ari and maturidi ulama in some topics, such as: "can a sa'yid change to shaqi and vice-versa"? (in the other thread, it is the question of the atheist that wasn't answered well).

    and also, the objections of heretical sects and answers by our imams. for example, the anecdote of abdu'l jabbar mu'tazili and ustaz abu is'haq isfarayini was quoted in another thread without the context. (we will see about it in sha'Allah wa bi tawfiqihi).

    ---
    wa billahi't tawfiq.
     
    Last edited: Mar 24, 2021
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  12. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    let us first start with imam laqani. the relevant lines in this topic from jawharah:

    =================================================================

    45. He is the Creator of the slave and all his actions (slave is a metaphor for the entire creation)
    He gives guidance to those whom He wishes that they reach (Him; i.e. Divine Pleasure)

    46. He disgraces whom He Wishes, that they be distanced (from His Grace)
    And fulfills the Promises that He has made for Whomsoever He Wills

    47. The success of the fortunate [sa'yid] is near Him from Pre-Eternity
    So also that of the doomed, the unfortunate [shaqiy]; and this does not change

    48. And near us, a slave has "kasb" and by virtue of which he is burdened [with responsibility]
    However, this does not have 'effect' in its outcome

    49. So a person is not compelled but can choose
    But he does not create any of his actions

    [#49 literally:
    So neither is he compelled and does not have a choice
    Nor is is he the creator of his own actions.]
    the "does not" in the first line is a double negative, meaning: 'he does have a choice'.
    ====

    53. It is possible for Allah ta'ala to create evil
    and good and islam and ignorance and kufr

    54. It is obligatory for us to bear faith in Destiny (qadr/qadar)
    And upon Divine Decree, as it has come down to us by narrated reports

    ====

    jawhara 45-54.png


    ======

    i request brothers to not rush and begin deriving judgements based on the literal meanings of the poem. poets use words to indicate certain things and should not be taken literally.

    wa billahi't tawfiq.
     
    Last edited: Mar 31, 2021
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  13. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    one more thing before we proceed:

    1. Allah Willed and Decreed that he is to sin.

    2. no one can disobey the Will of Allah and act contrary to what He has Decreed.

    3. but still: zayd cannot make predestination an excuse to evade himself for punishment.

    4. why exactly is zayd being punished for?

    ===
    simply repeating over and over and using synonyms to avoid the question will not make it go away. of course, you can begin to chant "strawman" "strawman" in the hope it will vanish.

    but the question will remain: "for what reason will zayd be punished?"
     
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  14. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    for the moment, let us leave the dispute behind. let us forget everything and start with some other aqidah text that people will probably accept without much demur.
     
    Last edited: Mar 20, 2021
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  15. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    let us start with bahar e shariat. of course, we have already seen this in the other thread. but we need to start somewhere - so here we go:

    bahar,v1 p12.png


    A23. He has destined [taqdīr] everything – whether good or evil – according to His Pre-eternal Knowledge. He Knew in Pre-eternity that all that would happen and everything that everyone would do; and accordingly, He has inscribed everything. Thus, it is not that we are compelled to do according to what He has Written; rather, He has written what we would do. For example, Zayd would do something evil; and thus, He Wrote evil for him. If Zayd were to do good, He would have Written good for him.

    ====
    someone objected that "the wording to be extremely imprecise and potentially dangerous".

    and to 'fix' the passage, they proposed the following "better explanation":

    Sins were written for Zayd because Allah decreed eternally that he is to sin. No one can ask "Why He did so?" Because He is the creator and He does whatever He wills. He is not asked what He does to the creation but the creation is asked. Zayd cannot make predestination an excuse to evade himself from punishment.

    [highlights mine].
    ---
    there are a few problems with this supposedly "better" explanation:

    Allah decreed eternally, that he is to sin.

    decreed - means to command, to ordain.

    he is to - means he is 'compelled' to. he cannot escape sin as it is not in his power to avoid it.

    ===
    now someone can accuse me of "putting words in their mouth" and they did not actually say: 'Allah commanded that he sin" and it is a straw-man argument because they never said it. it is really annoying to explain anything when people utter words and try to flee from their commonly understood meanings.

    the meaning of the above statement is as i have explained. (word by word).

    ----
    for example: a man said: i want to kill a messenger of Allah (al iyadhu billah). when asked, he said: "i was referring to a scorpion". his alternative interpretation will not be accepted. especially when we discuss on a topic, we have to stick to the commonly accepted meanings of words. in translation, however, there are varying choices by translators, and ideally where there is a probability of confusion, the original word should be mentioned to remove ambiguity.

    ---
    decreed is the commonly translated meaning of the arabic word: "qaDa" قضا

    and the english equivalent is command that one cannot escape. in other words, one is bound by the decree irrespective of whether they like it or not.

    similarly "he is to sin" is the equivalent of "compelled to sin".

    ---
    so the supposed 'better' translation is actually the position of the jabriyyah, as we will see shortly. in sha'Allah.
     
    Last edited: Mar 22, 2021
  16. abu Hasan

    abu Hasan Administrator

    mutafaqqih is the word used for those who are newly learned - or still in the process of learning; or pretenders to learning.

    unfortunately, the internet has made many a mutafaqqih to imagine that he is the mutakallim of the age. ulama translate basic aqidah works and even write on blogs to explain things to common folk. but a man should not delude himself that he has become an expert in aqidah by merely reading translations of basic texts.

    especially in a matter of qaDa and qadar (Divine Decree and Pre-destination) which is a very delicate issue - one should not argue unless one has the ability to look up texts of kalam.

    ---
    in a recent thread, one such mutafaqqih whose staple feed is a blog, and armed with a few english translations - has thrown a few rulings of takfir around and unbeknown to himself, is favouring the jabari position. as imam shafiyi said:

    فكل ما قال فهو فيه

    i do not have time to explain to an idiot, where the idiocy lies in his argument. let him remain in bliss that he has won the argument - but sadly, if he does not learn the proper aqidah, he will be a heretic.

    ---
    in this thread, i will try to explain from classical books of aqidah, the issue of qada and qadar. my iman is more dear to me than winning an argument on the internet - and i am sure many of you feel like that too.

    this thread will be locked to prevent people from hijacking it.

    wa billahi't tawfiq.
     
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